THE INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS FOR EMBRYOLOGICAL SCIENCE.

II.

NATURAL HISTORY AND NATURAL KNOWLEDGE.

The definition of science as the analysis and classification of facts leads the philosophical spokesmen of modern science to believe that an embryological account of thinking men is impossible, because it leads them to believe there is a chasm which is intellectually impassable between the facts of physics and the facts of consciousness.

Since the minds and senses by the aid of which we make scientific discoveries are generated from eggs, the progress of embryological science must bring us around sooner or later to the old question: What is science? What is it to know a thing?

In this paper I shall show the fitness of biological science for helping us to reconsider this great question.

1. May it not be that we understand a thing when we can tell what it means, and use it?

Philosophers tell us we understand a thing when we comprehend it, but it is my purpose to ask whether the progress of biological science may not lead us to think, with Berkeley, that we understand a thing when we can tell what it means and use it, and whether this definition of science may