THE ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE

In an admirable introduction to Herbert Spencer’s Synthetic Philosophy, by Alfred W. Tillet, occurs the suggestive observation that “one volume after another might be glanced at or even carefully read and no idea whatever obtained as to Spence’s aim.” Even the Study of Sociology, in the words of this author, “does not give any definite idea of the aim of Spence’s work” but no one “even superficially familiar with a moderate portion of Spencer’s monumental contributions to knowledge can fail to be impressed by the fact that it is from end to end an organized system of scientific knowledge.”

What after all is the real difference between scientific and general knowledge, or between organized and unorganized information? Is it not rather a difference in structure than in function, for, as said by Karl Pearson, “the classification of facts, the organization of their sequence, and relative significance, is the function of science,” which must be the objective of every attempt to gather and classify the knowledge extant on any particular subject. The moment we desire to apply a given train of thought to some practical purpose we are confronted by the necessity of understanding facts in their relative significance.

Yet so difficult is the practical task of arriving at sound conclusions in the presence of some complex phenomenon that even civilized man reasons as a rule in disregard of scientific principles, indifferent to the value or necessity of organized knowledge as a substitute for disorganized or chaotic information. The cause of this anomaly is of course quite obvious; the former process requires painstaking care in the accumulation and classification of facts,