THE THEORY OF NUMBERS

There is probably less difference between the methods of a physicist and a mathematician than is generally supposed. The most striking among them seems to me to be this, that the mathematician is in much more direct contact with reality. This may perhaps seem to you a paradox, since it is the physicist who deals with the subject-matter to which the epithet "real" is commonly applied. But a very little reflection will show that the "reality" of the physicist, whatever it may be (and it is extraordinarily difficult to say), has few or none of the attributes which common-sense instinctively marks as real. A chair may be a collection of whirling atoms, or an idea in the mind of God. It is not my business to suggest that one account of it is obviously more plausible than the other. Whatever the merits of either of them may be, neither draws its inspiration from the suggestions of common-sense.

Neither the philosophers, nor the physicists themselves, have ever put forward any very convincing account of what physical reality is, or of how the physicist passes, from the confused mass of fact or sensation with which he starts, to the construction of the objects which he classifies as real. We can not be said, therefore, to know what the subject-matter of physics is; but this need not prevent us from understanding the task which a physicist is trying to perform. That, clearly, is to correlate the incoherent body of facts confronting him with some definite and orderly scheme of abstract relations, the kind of scheme, in short, which he can borrow only from mathematics.

A mathematician, on the other hand, fortunately for him, is not concerned with this...