Europe's Population at a Turning Point

Negative Momentum and Low Fertility

Population momentum [HN3] measures the effect of the current age structure on future population growth (3, 4). A young population has positive momentum (a built-in tendency to grow). An older population can have negative momentum when low fertility leads to smaller numbers of children than of parents, locking in future decreases in the number of parents and a tendency toward population decline. Momentum can be calculated by performing a hypothetical projection in which all forces for change in population size except age structure are removed (5). We find that for the 15 member countries of the EU, low fertility [HN4] brought the population to the turning point from positive to negative momentum around the year 2000. Currently, negative momentum is small (see figure, above); population even grows for 15 years in our momentum projection before declining, because of the large numbers of people born during the baby boom of the 1960s. However, if the current fertility rate of around 1.5 births per woman persists until 2020, negative momentum will result in 88 million fewer people in 2100, if one assumes constant mortality and no net migration.

Fertility is currently low in Europe for two reasons: first, women are delaying births to later ages [the tempo effect (6, 7)] [HN5], and second, even after adjusting for this delay, fertility is below the level necessary for each generation to replace itself fully (low adjusted fertility). Delayed childbearing does not affect the total number of children women have over the course of their lives, provided they do not forgo postponed births altogether. However, it reduces the number of children born during the period in which delay is occurring, which lowers birth rates in that period and contributes to the aging of the population.

The population decline of 88 million resulting from 20 years of low fertility can be separated (Fig. 1) into contributions from the tempo effect and from low adjusted fertility. The tempo effect is assumed to be 0.3 children per woman, roughly consistent with recent experience in 10 EU countries for which data are available (8). Postponement of births may continue, because many social and economic factors still favor later childbearing (9). Adjusted fertility is assumed to remain constant at 1.8. Given these assumptions, if increases in the mean age of childbearing were halted, the period fertility [HN6] would rise from 1.5 to 1.8. Our simulations show that, under these conditions, substantially less negative momentum is generated, and ultimate population size is only 49 million lower than today's. Thus, 45% of the population decline caused by a birthrate of 1.5 over 20 more years can be attributed to the effect of the increasing age of childbearing women on birth rates. In general, we find that each decade of fertility at current levels leads to declines in ultimate population size of 25 to 40 million, with the contribution of timing remaining around 40% or more in all cases (see table). We arrive at the same conclusion when we assume that, instead of remaining constant, adjusted fertility continues to fall [(10), see supporting online material]. The effect caused by increasing age of childbearing clearly deserves attention not just in adjustments to fertility rates (6, 11), but also when considering determinants of the future size and age structure of Europe's population.

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Aging and Delayed Childbearing

Continued increases in the mean age of childbearing will also have significant effects on the age distribution within the population. In the scenario simulating an immediate halt to the delay in childbearing, the “support ratio” declines from about four working-age persons (ages 15 to 64) per elderly person (age 65+) to considerably less than three for most of the remainder of the century (see figure, above), if we assume 0 net migration and no changes in mortality. If the delay in childbearing continued with no change in adjusted fertility, the support ratio would further decline to almost 2, nearly doubling the demographic dependence burden as compared with the present. Twenty years of continued increases in the mean age of childbearing imply an additional decline in the support ratio of about 0.5 workers per elderly person by 2065, the year when the difference is most pronounced. The cumulative effects are substantial. Looked at from the perspective of the working-age population, continued delay of 10 to 40 years will imply that an additional 500 to 1500 million person-years of workers would be needed to support the elderly population over the rest of the century, as compared with a no-delay scenario.

Policy Implications

Over the coming decades, the decisive shift to an older age structure in Europe (12) will challenge social security and health systems, may hinder productivity gains, and could affect global competitiveness and economic growth [HN7]. It could also strain relations among generations, particularly between those who are on the contributing and receiving ends of public transfer programs. It may also diminish social cohesion, particularly if increasing labor demand leads to substantial immigration from other cultures. Although population aging is the main focus of population-related social, economic, and political concerns in Europe, there is also a deeply rooted fear of population decline (13) associated with a possible weakening of national identity and loss of international political and economic standing.

Policy discussions have primarily focused on adjusting to given demographic trends, by making structural adjustments to pension systems, labor markets, and health and fiscal systems. With already very high tax rates, however, there is a limit to how much governments can squeeze out of a shrinking labor force. Hence, discussions are beginning to turn to policies that could influence demographic trends themselves [HN8]. Because substantial increases in immigration remain politically unpopular, fertility may increasingly be considered as a policy variable (14). Childbearing could come to be considered a “social act” (15) rather than a purely private decision.

In 1976, a set of policies was enacted in East Germany that included much improved child-care facilities, financial benefits, and government-supported housing if a woman became pregnant. As a consequence, period fertility in East Germany, which had declined almost in parallel with West Germany, increased from 1.5 to 1.9 (16). The mean age of childbearing stayed below 25 years, while it increased to more than 28 years in the West. In contemporary Western Europe, however, there is pronounced public resistance to explicitly pro-natalist policies. This is partly because of infamous birth promotion programs in past fascist regimes and partly because births are often viewed as an obstacle for women pursuing careers and therefore not something the government should promote as an end in itself. Family policies in Europe today [HN9] are based instead on an equal-opportunities rationale and aim to help women combine child rearing with employment. Such policies seem to have had a small, if any, effect on period fertility (17).

Policies that aim to affect the timing of births rather than family size may be more acceptable. Such policies would have to address some of the prime reasons for continued childbearing delay, including inflexible higher education systems, youth unemployment, housing markets, and especially career patterns built around traditional male life-course models. Revamping the conventional sequence of life course transitions can also help solve conflicts between work and family (18). Health benefits may provide an additional rationale. A continued delay in childbearing has not only led to burgeoning numbers of infertility treatments but also to increasing medical concerns about health risks for mother and child associated with late pregnancies [HN10].

Halting the trend toward higher mean ages of childbearing would significantly moderate population aging and decline in Europe. Changes in the timing of births have been pointed out as a possible avenue for slowing population growth in developing countries, in that case by encouraging delays in childbearing (19). Here, we are suggesting the reverse: that discouraging further delays in childbearing could help confront the population-related challenge faced by Europe.