Political Attitudes Vary with Physiological Traits

In our Report ("Political attitudes vary with physiological traits," D. R. Hibbing et al., 19 September 2009, p. 1667) we present evidence that individuals displaying greater blink amplitudes subsequent to auditory startles and greater skin conductance increases in response to threatening visual images are more likely to hold a collection of political beliefs that we label "protective" (these beliefs include support of warrantless searches and opposition to gun control). On this basis, we suggest that those individuals whose physiology leads them to experience threats more viscerally are also likely to support policies that could be believed to ameliorate threats.

J. C. Gewirtz and B. N. Cuthbert offer an alternative explanation. They point out that participants with heightened physiological reactions to threat may not be generically predisposed to such responses but rather may have been "fearful" only at the time of testing. They speculate that those supporting protective policy positions are also likely to believe that "scientific advances will harm mankind" and therefore will be more easily startled when placed in a context that could be interpreted as scientific. Gewirtz and Cuthbert are quite right to point to the importance of context. Even subtle features of the immediate environment can influence physiological readings and we fully support their desire to see research replicated in other contexts. However, our suspicion in this case is that their concerns are unfounded.

Setting aside the questionable nature of the assertion that those who believe something will harm mankind are also more likely to startle in the presence of that thing (do we expect those believing methane from cattle exacerbates global warming to startle more easily in the presence of a cow?), the belief that certain participants in our study were made fearful by the looming presence of science and scientists may be based on misperceptions of the pertinent physical surroundings. There were no beakers and labcoats, only friendly graduate students and a computer terminal. It is true that sensors were attached to the participants but, if anything, this connoted a theme more medical than scientific. Moreover, several months before the physiological readings were taken, all participants visited the research site, expressed comfort, and volunteered to return for further tests. Based on their comments, they were mostly bemused that political scientists were doing this kind of research and excited to have parked in the shadow of the university's football stadium. Perhaps this is why there was no statistically significant difference in baseline heart rate and skin conductance levels of the groups professing high and low support for "protective" policies. If the entire scientific context of the experience made those supporting protective policies fearful, baseline physiological indicators give no indication of this.

Though we agree with Gewirtz and Cuthbert on the value of additional empirical work in this area, we caution against two directions suggested in their E-Letter. First, they are comfortable classifying people simply as "liberal" or "conservative," even though many people do not fit these overall molds and even though physiological responses correlate with certain specific issue clusters but not others. Second, Gewirtz and Cuthbert attempt to draw a connection between our results and issues of mental disorders by noting that "high responsiveness to threat is closely associated with anxiety disorders," but this does not mean there is necessarily a correlation between physiological threat sensitivity and mental health in larger non-clinical populations. Responding vigorously to threats is evolutionarily sensible, so the inclination to treat all those who do as suffering from a disorder is inaccurate and should be avoided. The unquestioned importance of context should not blind us to the fact that people differ—politically and physiologically. Moreover, the richness of these differences is not adequately captured by dichotomous distinctions between liberals and conservatives or between those with disorders and those without.

John R. Hibbing, Kevin B. Smith, Douglas R. Oxley

Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588, USA.

John R. Alford

Department of Political Science, Rice University, Houston, TX 77251, USA.

Matthew V. Hibbing

Department of Political Science, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801, USA.

Peter K. Hatemi

Virginia Institute for Psychiatric and Behavioral Genetics, Richmond, VA 23298, USA.