Books et al.Science & Society

Looking ahead

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Science  14 Sep 2018:
Vol. 361, Issue 6407, pp. 1079
DOI: 10.1126/science.aau9686

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  • International standards are needed for securing autonomous vehicles

    Andrew Robinson wrote an article entitled “Looking ahead” (1). Autonomous vehicles (AVs) will play a crucial role in our society in the self-driving age. However, current AVs have unsolved security vulnerabilities so that we must overcome the vulnerabilities and resolve all the problems. I have collected the known security vulnerabilities for AVs or connected vehicles (CVs) (2). There are two kinds of potential vehicle attacks: forged vehicle communications (in-vehicle network, inter-vehicle network or telematics, and vehicle access attacks), and sensor attacks. We must devise and develop several new technologies for nullifying those potential vehicle attacks where the fact of AVs security problems must be disclosed by scientists and engineers. In order to use autonomous vehicles in our society, international standards for securing sensors are highly demanded and needed.

    Forged vehicle communications:
    In-vehicle network attacks
    In OBD2 (On Board Diagnostics level 2) standard, no security is embedded or provided. Therefore, in the in-vehicle network communications, security functions including encryption / decryption between ECUs (electronic control units) must be embedded in OBD2 or the OBD2 standard must be replaced with the better standards for AVs or CVs.

    Inter-vehicle network attacks
    In the inter-vehicle network or telematics, since 4G/LTE/3G hijacking has been reported (3,4), the new communications networks including 5G or other robust...

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    Competing Interests: None declared.

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